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Summary Statement 1 
 2 
One of the most fundamental principles of patient safety is to investigate and learn 3 
from the past in order to improve the future. However, healthcare organisations can 4 
find it challenging to develop the robust organizational processes and work practices 5 
that are needed to rigorously investigate and learn from safety incidents. Key 6 
challenges include difficulties developing specialist knowledge and expertise, 7 
understanding complex incidents, coordinating collaborative action and positively 8 
changing practice. These are the types of challenges that simulation is commonly 9 
used to address. As such, this paper proposes that there are considerable 10 
opportunities to integrate simulation more deeply and systematically into routine 11 
efforts to investigate and learn from safety incidents. This paper explores how this 12 
might be done by defining five key areas where simulation could be productively 13 
integrated throughout the investigation and learning process, drawing on examples of 14 
current practice and analogous applications in healthcare and other industries.  15 
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3 
Imitating incidents: how simulation can improve safety investigation and 1 
learning from incidents 2 
 3 
When things go wrong in healthcare, and when patients are harmed, it is essential 4 
that incidents are rigorously investigated so that systems and practices can be 5 
improved and similar events avoided in future. The need to learn from incidents has 6 
long been an organizing principle of patient safety improvement,1,2 but healthcare 7 
organisations can find it challenging to develop the robust work practices and 8 
organizational processes that are required to investigate and learn from serious 9 
events.3,4,5,6,7 This can be a serious problem. Poor quality or haphazard approaches to 10 
investigating and learning from incidents can have considerable and far-ranging 11 
consequences. They can allow safety problems to persist, exposing future patients to 12 
harm.8,9 They can prevent harmed patients and families from being provided the 13 
truthful information they deserve.10,11,12 They can leave healthcare staff working in 14 
suboptimal, frustrating and poorly designed healthcare systems.13,14 And they can 15 
result in the misidentification of causal factors, leading to organisational resources 16 
being wasted on irrelevant or inappropriate issues.15,16 17 
  18 
Accordingly, a range of recent initiatives in healthcare systems around the world aim 19 
to improve the quality, scope and impact of safety investigation in healthcare. This 20 
4 
includes a renewed focus on investigation methods that translate findings into 1 
practical improvements17 and the establishment of national patient safety 2 
investigation bodies that are modelled on well-established approaches in other 3 
safety-critical industries.9,18,19 Simulation has long played a major role in efforts to 4 
improve patient safety,20,21 and many of the challenges commonly associated with 5 
investigating and learning from safety incidents are those that simulation is typically 6 
used to address,22 such as developing practical expertise, exploring complex 7 
scenarios, improving organizational processes and strengthening social relations. 8 
This paper proposes that a closer and more systematic integration of simulation into 9 
routine activities of safety investigation would provide healthcare systems with a 10 
variety of opportunities to improve practices of investigation and enhance what 11 
organizations learn from incidents. The paper aims to develop a broad framework for 12 
understanding how simulation and investigation might be more systematically 13 
integrated across the entire process of investigating and learning from incidents, and 14 
to begin to map out a future vision for the rigorous application of simulation 15 
techniques to incident investigation. To do this, the key challenges in current 16 
approaches to investigating patient safety incidents are first described. Then, the 17 
paper defines five key strategies for using simulation that address each of these 18 
challenges and improve the practices of investigating and learning from incidents, 19 
5 
drawing on current practice and future potential strategies. The paper concludes by 1 
reflecting on how this work may be taken forward.  2 
 3 
 4 
Investigative challenges 5 
 6 
The core purpose of safety investigation is to systematically understand the past in 7 
order to improve the future.23 Rigorous and routine safety investigation has been a 8 
fundamental feature of other safety-critical industries for many years but remains a 9 
relatively young discipline in healthcare—and may at times not even be recognised as 10 
a formal discipline that depends on specialised skills, knowledge, methods and tools. 11 
In aviation, for example, the history of formally investigating serious safety incidents 12 
reaches back over a century and is underpinned by well-established professional 13 
communities, institutional arrangements and sophisticated tools and methods.24,25,26 14 
Despite considerable effort over the past two decades, many healthcare systems have 15 
yet to develop equivalent institutional arrangements and professional communities 16 
that ensure safety incidents are routinely and robustly investigated and result in 17 
rapid, widespread and sustainable improvements.27,28  The main challenges faced by 18 
healthcare systems in investigating and learning from patient safety incidents are 19 
fivefold, and each is at least partially addressable through simulation (Table 1).  20 
6 
 1 
First, safety investigation is a challenging and specialist task that depends on the 2 
work of expert safety investigators with highly specialised knowledge and skills. 3 
These specialist skills of investigation are not typically widespread in healthcare.4,12  4 
Second, investigating and responding to a serious patient safety event typically 5 
involves a range of organizations and professional groups working together. This 6 
requires robust organizational processes including effective resourcing, coordination 7 
and communication that are separated from any parallel activities concerning legal 8 
liability and blame. It is not uncommon for these processes to become confused in 9 
ways that undermine effective investigation and learning.3,13 Third, systematically 10 
analysing and addressing the causes of patient safety issues can be deeply 11 
problematic. Serious safety incidents are complex and usually result from myriad 12 
interactions between human, technical, organizational and regulatory factors.29 13 
Solutions can be equally complex and moving from analysis to action remains a 14 
persistent challenge.13,17 Fourth, it can be challenging to ensure that lessons are 15 
embedded in practice and that the findings and recommendations from 16 
investigations lead to material changes in practical work. Learning can only be said to 17 
have occurred when knowledge, activities and technologies on the frontline of 18 
healthcare are updated and improved.30,31 Fifth, one of the most difficult aspects of 19 
learning from serious events is making sure that the lessons from investigations have 20 
7 
a system-wide impact, leading to improvements in safety across multiple 1 
organizations. At core, investigation and learning are only successful if similar 2 
serious events are avoided across a healthcare system, preventing other patients 3 
being harmed in the same way.23,27  4 
 5 
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Integrating simulation and safety investigation: five strategies 7 
 8 
This paper proposes that deeply integrating simulation into the processes of 9 
investigating and learning from serious safety incidents provides opportunities to 10 
enhance the practices of safety investigation, develop more robust systems of analysis 11 
and improvement, and more reliably spread and embed lessons across healthcare 12 
systems. Each of the key challenges facing investigation and learning, described 13 
above, can be addressed through the careful and systematic use of five interconnected 14 
simulation strategies (Table 1), and each of these strategies are explored in turn 15 
below. Here, simulation is defined broadly as any technique that can replace or 16 
amplify real-world experiences for the purposes of reflective learning.32 This spans 17 
role-play, table-top exercises, online or virtual reality simulations, task trainers and 18 
fully immersive simulations using standardised patients and other actors. These 19 
simulation strategies can support learning at multiple levels of a healthcare system, 20 
8 
from adaptation in individual skills and knowledge, to improvement in teamwork and 1 
collaboration, to reform and redesign of organisational systems and processes.31   2 
 3 
<< INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE >> 4 
 5 
Immersive investigator training 6 
 7 
Investigating serious patient safety incidents requires safety investigators to reliably 8 
apply expert knowledge and specialised skills to complex scenarios in which people 9 
are distressed and information is often ambiguous and contested. The work of 10 
investigators is highly varied, including interpreting clinical and organizational data; 11 
analysing system design and human factors; sensitively interviewing harmed 12 
patients, bereaved relatives and healthcare workers; and developing robust 13 
improvement recommendations. This requires a mix of deep technical expertise and 14 
practical skill. Immersive simulation-based training has long been used in other 15 
safety-critical settings such as aviation, where investigators are able to undertake 16 
multi-week simulated investigations as part of their training, from examining 17 
wreckage sites to handling media interviews.33  Simulation-based training represents 18 
a key strategy for developing the practical skills and knowledge of safety 19 
9 
investigators,34 and sensitising investigators to the biases that can adversely influence 1 
investigations.35   2 
 3 
Some forms of table-top and online simulations are used in current investigation 4 
training or safety improvement activities.36,37,38 However, there are significant 5 
opportunities to more systematically implement immersive investigator training, 6 
targeted at developing key competencies such as interviewing, evidence 7 
identification, systems analysis and recommendation development. In more intensive 8 
future forms, investigator training could take the form of simulating end-to-end 9 
investigations spanning multiple days or weeks, enacting the entire trajectory of a 10 
major investigation as a core component of investigator training. Simulations could 11 
recreate the conditions, challenges and interactions necessary in real-world 12 
investigation, beginning with the immediate aftermath of an incident, using actors to 13 
allow investigators to interview patients, families and staff, and simulating an 14 
examination of the incident setting, equipment, data and records. Simulation training 15 
could then move to the work of analysing and interpreting data, including liaising 16 
with stakeholders such as executives, regulators, coroners and media—played by 17 
actors—completed by developing a final report and recommendations. Any of these 18 
specific activities can be extracted as shorter task-oriented simulation scenarios, but 19 
longitudinal, end-to-end simulations would allow investigators to learn how to both 20 
10 
apply and integrate the various technical and social skills, investigative techniques 1 
and analysis methods required of them in high-fidelity simulations where there is no 2 
risk of causing further emotional distress to patients, families or staff. This approach 3 
would be analogous to the longitudinal immersive simulation training that is 4 
increasingly being used to support effective transition of interns.39    5 
 6 
 7 
Improving investigative infrastructure 8 
 9 
Patient safety incidents often result from a complex set of factors that span many 10 
different parts of a variety of organizations across a healthcare system. These include 11 
things like communication problems between ambulatory and secondary care, 12 
oversights by accreditors or regulators, and poor design decisions by equipment 13 
manufacturers. Investigating complex safety issues therefore requires a well-14 
developed investigative infrastructure of robust systems, protocols and processes that 15 
allow investigations to effectively bring together and coordinate different participants 16 
such as patients, managers, clinicians, subject matter experts and executives; support 17 
efficient communication with all parties involved—especially patients and families; 18 
and span different units, departments or organizations where necessary. This 19 
investigative infrastructure can be challenging to develop in many healthcare 20 
11 
systems, particularly where it has emerged from prior administrative arrangements 1 
focused on the management of complaints or medico-legal risks, where processes are 2 
typically oriented to the resolution of individual cases rather than the examination of 3 
broader system safety issues.  4 
 5 
In future, the infrastructure that supports effective investigation—such as 6 
communication channels, coordination mechanisms, information systems, 7 
management structures, and related policies and protocols—could be routinely tested 8 
and improved through different forms of simulation.22 Similar activities are already 9 
used to explore and improve organisational processes related to patient safety. For 10 
example, table-top group simulations of patient safety systems can be undertaken 11 
with groups of healthcare executives to explore and reflect on safety strategies and 12 
accountability structures in healthcare organisations,40 or to simulate and explore the 13 
relationship of local organisational activities with regional or national policy 14 
requirements.41 Likewise, crisis management scenarios are commonly used to test 15 
organisational policies, develop leadership capacity and strengthen communication 16 
channels for dealing with organisation-wide crises.42,43  These existing approaches 17 
could be extended and applied more directly to the organisational systems and 18 
processes that are required to manage major incident investigations by, for example, 19 
conducting annual in situ simulations of a major safety investigation to test and 20 
12 
improve the processes and protocols for investigating serious safety incidents. Ideally 1 
these would be conducted in collaboration with other organizations in a local health 2 
system and would include all key organizational participants—including executives 3 
and senior clinicians—to test organizational processes and strengthen 4 
communication channels across organizational boundaries—all while removed from 5 
the stresses of an actual adverse event. However implemented, simulations could 6 
target key competencies and organisational processes that include: initial response to 7 
an incident; liaising with and supporting patients, families and staff; coordinating 8 
with other healthcare organizations along the patient pathway; and communicating 9 
with other actors such as regulators, coroners and the media.  10 
 11 
 12 
Exploring causal factors and solutions 13 
 14 
A fundamental purpose of investigating incidents is to understand the practical 15 
problems that contribute to safety issues in healthcare, and to determine the changes 16 
that can address those problems and make care safer. This process can be challenging 17 
because incidents emerge from complex interactions between a wide variety of 18 
human, technical and organizational factors that combine in unexpected ways in real-19 
world practice. Investigations need to grapple with the complexity of real-world 20 
13 
practice to understand the causes of incidents and to recommend appropriate 1 
solutions. Simulation offers valuable ways of both retrospectively exploring the 2 
underlying causes of incidents, as well as prospectively developing and testing 3 
solutions. Formal methods of safety analysis that are used in different healthcare 4 
settings can sometimes incorporate simulation techniques to recreate elements of an 5 
event or context to better understand the causal factors involved, including 6 
retrospective Root Cause Analysis,4 prospective Failure Mode and Effect Analysis22 7 
and other systems-oriented incident analysis methods.44 Equally, simulation is used 8 
to design, evaluate and test new healthcare products and services,45 such as drug 9 
packaging46 or new hospital facilities.47 Likewise, different forms of simulation—such 10 
as virtual reconstructions or simulation centre re-enactments—are widely and 11 
routinely used in safety-critical sectors such as aviation to recreate serious incidents 12 
to understand how and why events unfolded.48,49  13 
 14 
These current applications of simulation indicate that there are considerable 15 
opportunities to make more widespread use of simulation when investigating patient 16 
safety incidents and developing subsequent improvements in healthcare. One way 17 
would be to routinize the use of in situ simulation to recreate incidents as part of all 18 
major safety investigations. This might involve bringing a multi-professional team 19 
together in the original setting to re-enact a serious incident, allowing different 20 
14 
explanatory theories to be tested against real-world practice and providing 1 
opportunities to uncover hidden human factors and systems issues. One well-2 
publicised example of this is the in situ simulation used to investigate the inadvertent 3 
injection of Chlorhexidine during a lower limb angiogram that led to a patient's leg 4 
being amputated, revealing a range of common human factors issues and potential 5 
solutions.50 Likewise, investigation processes that deeply integrate simulation 6 
techniques into the development of safety improvements and recommendations 7 
following serious incidents could help underpin more practical, robust and reliable 8 
changes to organisational process and practice.51  9 
 10 
 11 
Embedding lessons in practice  12 
 13 
One of the key objectives of incident investigation is to improve safety by bringing 14 
about changes in knowledge, skills, practice and process at the frontline of healthcare 15 
delivery. This requires regularly developing safety recommendations and other 16 
insights from investigations and translating them into practice. Simulation offers a 17 
direct route for this. It is common practice for clinical simulation and team training 18 
scenarios to be derived from past experiences and to draw inspiration from prior 19 
events, both as a basis for improving clinical and teamwork skills20,52 and as a route 20 
15 
to making broader modifications and improvements to local work systems, cognitive 1 
aids and care processes.53 There have also been innovative attempts to more 2 
systematically link healthcare simulation training programmes to the findings and 3 
recommendations from recent local events and incident investigations.54,55 This 4 
ongoing translation of the findings of past events into improved future practices is 5 
widely instituted and supported in other safety-critical industries, where safety 6 
investigation activities are closely linked to routine and regular simulation training 7 
programmes.56 In airlines, for example, information on recent incidents is regularly 8 
shared with simulation training programmes to modify old scenarios or introduce 9 
new ones.23  10 
 11 
Given the long experience in the healthcare simulation community of translating past 12 
events into future learning opportunities, there are clearly significant opportunities 13 
to use simulation to more systematically and routinely transform specific findings of 14 
incident investigations into practical improvements in care delivery. As with the 15 
other strategies defined here, fully realising these opportunities would require 16 
significant resourcing and leadership commitment to both deeply integrate 17 
simulation programmes into the routine delivery of healthcare, and to develop tight 18 
linkages between those simulation programmes and patient safety analysis and 19 
investigation teams. Examples of successfully integrating simulation education 20 
16 
programmes into the rapid design, development and implementation of new clinical 1 
and organisational practices demonstrates the importance of building strong 2 
relationships between simulation groups and other key patient safety and clinical 3 
units across a healthcare system.51 More closely integrating safety investigation teams 4 
with simulation programmes raise important practical questions. For instance, 5 
patient safety investigation methods may need updating, to include a defined process 6 
to identify issues suitable for rapid improvement through simulation-based training. 7 
Equally, the outputs of investigations may need to be improved, to provide the level 8 
of practical and contextual detail required to develop high-fidelity simulation 9 
scenarios.57 And simulation teams would need to become responsive and flexible to 10 
quickly adapt scenarios and develop updates. All of this would require significant 11 
organizational resourcing. 12 
 13 
 14 
Vicariously probing systems 15 
 16 
A persistent challenge in patient safety concerns how to spread lessons from 17 
incidents to other organizations and across entire healthcare systems.27 These 18 
processes of vicarious learning—where organizations proactively learn from events 19 
that occur elsewhere58—can be challenging because the context in which an incident 20 
17 
originally occurred may differ in important ways from contexts in other settings. The 1 
relevance and importance of lessons learnt in one organization may therefore not be 2 
readily apparent in other settings. Likewise, safety improvements will typically need 3 
to be modified and adapted to work elsewhere. As such, vicarious learning depends 4 
on organizations actively using incidents that occur elsewhere as a trigger to test and 5 
analyse their own systems and adapt safety recommendations to their local context. 6 
Simulation provides a range of techniques to test and reflect on current work 7 
practices and organisational processes, and is often used in healthcare to identify 8 
hidden or latent safety risks in current clinical systems,59,60,61 or prepare for major 9 
crises such as outbreaks of highly communicable diseases.51 ‘Systems-probing’ has 10 
long been advocated as a key function of healthcare simulation,22,62 and other sectors 11 
actively use systems-probing simulations to manage and regulate risk. For example, 12 
the safety and soundness of financial institutions is regularly explored with simulated 13 
virtual 'stress tests' that test the impact of extreme economic events.63 14 
 15 
Systems-probing simulations therefore represent a key mechanism to support 16 
vicarious learning from serious safety incidents across healthcare systems. Routinely 17 
attempting to recreate incidents that have occurred in other healthcare 18 
organisations—such as a wrong-route high-risk medication incident in cancer units—19 
allows the safety of local systems to be examined. This is often done informally, 20 
18 
through storytelling or ‘trigger videos’ of serious incidents that prompt reflection on 1 
and inquiry into local systems and practices.22 Anecdotally, high-profile and 2 
emotionally engaging films that retell the story of serious incidents51,57 appear to have 3 
triggered widespread reflection and change.64 More resource intensive in situ 4 
simulations of major events can provide a richer view of actual, rather than imagined, 5 
work processes, and have been used to drive change in local systems and practices 6 
such as relating to obstetric emergencies.53 There are also opportunities for 7 
regulators, accreditors and other system supervisors to more formally incorporate 8 
systems-probing safety 'stress tests' in their assessment regimes. For example, 9 
processes of hospital inspection or accreditation could routinely include a simulated 10 
test based on serious incidents experienced elsewhere, such as a table-top simulation 11 
of a major equipment or power failure, or the multi-organization coordination that is 12 
required in rapidly diagnosing and treating a child seriously ill with sepsis.65 If 13 
resourced appropriately and integrated into routine practice, vicarious systems-14 
probing simulations offer one route to turning passive incident investigation reports 15 
into active processes of vicarious learning that could help ensure lessons travel widely 16 
around a healthcare system.  17 
 18 
 19 
19 
Conclusion: Simulating investigation and investigating 1 
simulation  2 
 3 
This paper proposes that deeper and more systematic integration between the field of 4 
simulation and activities of safety investigation offers a broad range of opportunities 5 
for enhancing how healthcare systems routinely understand and learn from safety 6 
incidents. Five key strategies are proposed to help healthcare systems maximise what 7 
is learnt from past incidents, and address some of the core challenges that healthcare 8 
organisations commonly face in incident investigation (Table 1). These strategies 9 
span the entire process of investigating and learning from incidents: improving 10 
investigator training, strengthening organizational systems, supporting analysis 11 
methods, embedding lessons in practice and widely sharing improvements. To date, 12 
healthcare simulation techniques have been applied in each of these areas in some 13 
form, and in some areas are well-advanced. By defining a framework of five key 14 
strategies, this paper aims to provide a broader view of how simulation can be 15 
applied in an integrated way to investigating and learning from patient safety 16 
incidents, as well as to begin outlining a future vision of potential practice in each of 17 
these areas as a spur for future research.  18 
 19 
20 
Developing this work further will require considerable effort, both in research and in 1 
practice. The vision of deeply integrating simulation into the fabric of healthcare 2 
delivery is a long-standing aspiration for many in the simulation community,22,32,51 3 
and the framework described here represents an elaboration of a small part of that. 4 
As such, further integrating simulation into the routine activities of incident 5 
investigation faces similar challenges. One of the main challenges concerns 6 
organizational resourcing and capacity. Bringing more sophisticated forms of 7 
simulation into routine investigative activities—such as in situ recreations of 8 
incidents or longitudinal immersive education programmes for investigators—would 9 
likely require significant investment, along with specialist expertise and technical 10 
support that is not yet widely available. Likewise, simulation programmes and 11 
organisational structures would likely need considerable redesign to support the 12 
routine engagement of many different organizational participants in incident 13 
simulations, from senior executives to frontline staff, and would need to be 14 
appropriately resourced to respond rapidly and flexibly to the regular release of 15 
investigation findings and recommendations. These all represent major 16 
organizational challenges that would need ambitious and committed support from 17 
healthcare leaders. The framework described here also points to a wide range of 18 
important avenues for future research, which would require a broad programme of 19 
work. In the broadest of terms, these questions concern the optimal design, purpose 20 
21 
and modality of simulation techniques that can support processes of investigating 1 
and learning from past incidents at different levels of a healthcare system. Given the 2 
long time periods that can unfold between implementing new simulation techniques 3 
and resulting changes in organisational systems and processes, any programme of 4 
research would need to develop careful evaluation strategies to examine both the 5 
long-term impacts on safety performance and organisational design, as well as 6 
shorter-term changes in practices and knowledge. Engaging with these issues in 7 
research and practice, and more closely integrating simulation with investigation, 8 
points to a variety of ways that healthcare can build a more robust, integrated and 9 
system-wide approach to investigation and learning. It also offers rich opportunities 10 
to further explore and expand the boundaries of healthcare simulation as a 11 
fundamental safety improvement strategy.  12 
 13 
 14 
15 
22 
Financial disclosure summary  1 
This work received no financial support. The author acted as an advisor to the Public 2 
Administration Select Committee inquiry into the investigation of clinical incidents in 3 
the NHS, was a member of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch expert 4 
advisory group and is a ‘researcher-in-residence’ at the Healthcare Safety 5 
Investigation Branch.  6 
 7 
  8 
23 
References  1 
1. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS: To err is human: Building a Safer 2 
Health System. Washington, DC, Institute of Medicine, 1999.   3 
2. Department of Health: An Organization with a Memory: Report of an Expert 4 
Group on Learning from Adverse Events in the NHS Chaired by the Chief 5 
Medical Officer. London, Department of Health, 2000.    6 
3. Macrae C: The Problem with Incident Reporting. BMJ Qual Saf 2016; 7 
25(2):71-75.    8 
4. Peerally MF, Carr S, Waring J, Dixon-Woods M: The problem with root cause 9 
analysis. BMJ Qual Saf, Published Online First: 23 June  2016. 10 
doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2016-005511    11 
5. Francis R: Independent Inquiry into Care Provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS 12 
Foundation Trust January 2005–March 2009. London, The Stationery Office, 13 
2010. 14 
6. Quality of Care Information Protection Act Review Committee: QCIPA Review 15 
24 
Committee Recommendations. Ontario, 2014. 1 
7. Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care: Review of the 2 
Department of Health and Human Services’ management of a critical issue as 3 
Djerriwarrh Health Services. Victoria, 2015. 4 
8. Thomas M, Schultz TJ, Hannaford N, Runciman WB: Mapping the limits of 5 
safety reporting systems in health care-what lessons can we actually learn. 6 
Med J Aust 2011; 194(12):635-9. 7 
9. Macrae C, Vincent C: Learning from failure: the need for independent safety 8 
investigation in healthcare. J R Soc Med 2014; 107:439–43. 9 
10. Titcombe J: Joshua’s Story: Uncovering the Morecambe Bay NHS Scandal. 10 
London, Anderson Wallace, 2015.   11 
11. Zimmerman TM, Amori G: Including Patients in Root Cause and System 12 
Failure Analysis: Legal and Psychological Implications. J Healthc Risk Manag 13 
2015; 27(2):27–34.    14 
12. Care Quality Commission: Learning from serious incidents in NHS acute 15 
hospitals: A review of the quality of investigation reports. London, CQC, 2016.  16 
25 
13. Mitchell I, Schuster A, Smith K, Pronovost P, Wu A. Patient safety incident 1 
reporting: a qualitative study of thoughts and perceptions of experts 15 years 2 
after “ To Err is Human.” BMJ Qual Saf 2016; 25:92-99/  3 
14. Berwick, D and the National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in 4 
England: A Promise to Learn – A Commitment to Act. London, Department of 5 
Health, 2013. 6 
15. Turner B, Pidgeon N: Man-Made Disasters. Oxford, Butterworth-Heinemman, 7 
1997.  8 
16. Wildavsky A: Searching for Safety. Oxford, Transaction, 1988.  9 
17. National Patient Safety Foundation: RCA2: Improving Root Cause Analyses 10 
and Actions to Prevent Harm. Boston, MA, NPSF, 2016.  11 
18. Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch Expert Advisory Group: Report of the 12 
Expert Advisory Group: Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch. London, 13 
Department of Health, 2016.    14 
19. Norwegian Government: Act on the State Investigation Commission for the 15 
Health and Care Services. Oslo, Norway, 2017. 16 
20. Gaba DM, Howard SK, Fish KJ, Smith BE, Sowb YA: Simulation-based 17 
26 
training in anesthesia crisis resource management (ACRM): a decade of 1 
experience. Simul. Gaming 2001; 32(2):175–193.  2 
21. Schmidt E, Goldhaber-Fiebert SN, Ho LA, McDonald KM: Simulation 3 
exercises as a patient safety strategy. Ann. Intern. Med 2013; 158(2):426-32. 4 
22. Driver JE, Gaba DM, Lighthall GK: The benefits of using simulation in risk 5 
management and patient safety. In B. Youngberg (Ed.), Principes of Risk 6 
Management and Patient Safety. London, Jones and Bartlett 2011. 7 
23. Macrae C, Vincent C: Investigating for Improvement: Building a National 8 
Safety Investigator for Healthcare. London, Clinical Human Factors Group, 9 
2017.  10 
24. ATSB: Analysis, Causality and Proof in Safety Investigations. Canberra, 11 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2007.  12 
25. Macrae C: Close Calls: Managing Risk and Resilience in Airline Flight Safety. 13 
London, Palgrave, 2014  14 
26. Woods DD, Dekker S, Cook R, Johannesen L, Sarter N: Behind human error, 15 
2nd edition. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2010.  16 
27. Donaldson L: When will health care pass the orange-wire test? Lancet 2004; 17 
27 
364:1567–8. 1 
28. Trbovich P, Shojania KG: Root-cause analysis: swatting at mosquitoes versus 2 
draining the swamp. BMJ Qual Saf 2017, First Published Online 3 
doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2016- 006229.  4 
29. Reason J: Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Aldershot, 5 
Ashgate, 1997.  6 
30. Sujan M: An organization without a memory: a qualitative study of hospital 7 
staff perceptions on reporting and organizational learning for patient safety. 8 
Reliability Eng Syst Saf 2015; 144:45–52. 9 
31. Drupsteen L, Guldenmund FW: What Is Learning? A Review of the Safety 10 
Literature to Define Learning from Incidents, Accidents and Disasters. 11 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 2014; 22(2):81–96. 12 
32. Gaba DM: The Future Vision of Simulation in Healthcare. Simul Healthc 13 
2007; 2(2):126–135.  14 
33. Cranfield Safety and Accident Investigation Centre: Fundamental of accident 15 
investigation Web site. 16 
https://www.cranfield.ac.uk/~/media/files/brochure/fundamentalsofaccident17 
investigationweb.ashx 18 
28 
34. Saunders-Smits GN, Schuurman MJ, Rans CD: Forensic Engineering: 1 
Learning by Accident—Teaching Investigation Skills to Graduate Students 2 
Using Real-life Accident Simulations. American Institute of Aeronautics and 3 
Astronautics, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.2514/6.2015-1516  4 
35. Woodcock K, Drury CG, Smiley A, Ma J: Using simulated investigations for 5 
accident investigation studies. Appl Ergon 2005; 36:1–12.  6 
36. Murphy M, Duff J, Whitney J, Canales B, Markham MJ, Close J: 7 
Implementation of a mock root cause analysis  to provide simulated patient 8 
safety training. BMJ Open Qual 2017; 6:e000096.  9 
37. Health Foundation: A year in an hour: Quality Improvement through 10 
Interactive Simulations Web site. 11 
http://www.health.org.uk/programmes/evidence-practice/projects/year-12 
hour-quality-improvement-through-interactive-simulations 13 
38. Armstrong Institute for Patient Safety and Quality: Simu-Leader: Training in 14 
leadership for patient safety and quality improvement. Web site. 15 
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/armstrong_institute/improvement_project16 
s/simuleader.html 17 
39. Laack TA, Newman JS, Goyal DG, Torsher LC: A 1-Week Simulated Internship 18 
29 
Course Helps Prepare Medical Students for Transition to Residency. Simul 1 
Healthc 2010; 5(3):127–132.  2 
40. Rosen MA, Goeschel CA, Che XX, Fawole JO, Rees D, Curran R: (2015). 3 
Simulation in the Executive Suite. Simul Healthc 2015; 10(6):372–377.  4 
41. Cohen D, Vlaev I, McMahon L, Harvey S, Mitchell A, Borovoi L, & Darzi A: The 5 
Crucible simulation. Health Care Manage Rev 2017; 42(4):1–10.  6 
42. Waller MJ, Lei Z, Pratten R: Focusing on Teams in Crisis Management 7 
Education: An Integration and Simulation-Based Approach. Acad Manage 8 
Learn Educ 2014; 13(2):208–221.  9 
43. Newton, C: Protect the brand or die trying: inside a fake social media crisis. 10 
The Verge Web site. https://www.theverge.com/2015/3/20/8266539/sxsw-11 
2015-social-media-crisis-simulation-polpeo 12 
44. Pickup L, Lang A, Atkinson S, Sharples S: The dichotomy of the application of 13 
a systems approach in UK healthcare the challenges and priorities for 14 
implementation. Ergonomics 2017, Online first 15 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2017.1306632 16 
45. Health Quality Council of Alberta: Simulation based mock up evaluation 17 
framework. Calgary, Health Quality Council of Alberta, 2016. 18 
30 
46. Garcia BH,
 
Elenjord R,
 
Bjornstad C,
 
Halvorsen KH,
 
Hortemo S,
 
Madsen S: 1 
Safety and efficiency of a new generic package labelling: a before and after 2 
study in a simulated setting. BMJ Qual Saf 2017; 26:817-823. 3 
47. Bender J, Shields R, Kennally K. Testing with simulation before a big move at 4 
Women & Infants Hospital. Med Health R I 2010; 93:145–150.  5 
48. National Transportation Safety Board: NTSB Accident animations Web site. 6 
https://www.ntsb.gov/Pages/animations.aspx 7 
49. Air Accidents Investigation Branch: Report on the accident to Bombardier 8 
CL600-2B16 Series 604, N90AG at Birmingham International Airport 4 9 
January 2002. Farnborough, Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2004. 10 
50. The Human Factor: Learning from Gina’s Story. Web site. 11 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v1⁄4IJfoLvLLoFo 12 
51. Phrampus PE, O’Donnell JM, Farkas D, Abernethy D, Brownlee K, Dongilli T, 13 
Martin S:  Rapid Development and Deployment of Ebola Readiness Training 14 
Across an Academic Health System. Simul Healthc 2016; 11(2):82–88.  15 
52. Gaba DG, Fish KJ, Howard SK, Burden AR: Crisis Management in 16 
Anaesthesiology. London, Elsevier Saunders, 2014.  17 
53. Macrae C, Draycott D: Delivering high reliability in maternity care: In situ 18 
31 
simulation as a source of organizational resilience. Safety Science 2016, 1 
Published Online First http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.10.019  2 
54. Peerally MF, Fores M, Powell R, Durbridge M, Carr S: Implementing Themes 3 
From Serious Incidents Into Simulation Training For Junior Doctors. BMJ 4 
Simulation and Technology Enhanced Learning 2014, 1(Suppl 1), A22-A22. 5 
55. Austin N, Goldhaber-Fiebert S, Daniels K, Arafeh J, Grenon V, Welle D, 6 
Lipman S: Building Comprehensive Strategies for Obstetric Safety. Anesth 7 
Analg 2016; 123(5):1181–1190.  8 
56. Civil Aviation Authority: Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report: Accident to 9 
Boeing 747-436 G-BNLL. Gatwick, Civil Aviation Authority Safety Regulation 10 
Group, 2015.  11 
57. Simpact: The Elaine Bromiley Case Web site. https://vimeo.com/103516601 12 
58. Denrell J: Vicarious learning, undersampling of failure, and the myths of 13 
management. Organization Science 2003; 14(3):227-243. 14 
59. Auerbach M, Kessler DO, Patterson M: The use of in situ simulation to detect 15 
latent safety threats in paediatrics: a cross-sectional survey. BMJ Simul. 16 
Technol. Enhanced Learning 2015; 1:77–82.  17 
32 
60. Patterson MD, Geis GL, Falcone RA, LeMaster T, Wears RL: In situ 1 
simulation: detection of safety threats and teamwork training in a high risk 2 
emergency department. BMJ Qual Saf 2013; 22(6):468–477.   3 
61. Ventre KM, Barry JS, Davis D, Baiamonte VL, Wentworth AC, Pietras M: 4 
Using in situ simulation to evaluate operational readiness of a children's 5 
hospital-based obstetrics unit. Simul Healthc 2014; 9(2):102–111.  6 
62. Hamman WR, Beaudin-Seiler BM, Beaubien JM, Gullickson AM, Gross AC, 7 
Orizondo-Korotko K: Using in situ simulation to identify and resolve latent 8 
environmental threats to patient safety: case study involving a labor and 9 
delivery ward. J Patient Saf 2009: 5(3):184–187.  10 
63. Bank of England: The Bank of England’s approach to stress testing the UK 11 
banking system. London, The Bank of England, 2017.  12 
64. Syed M: Black Box Thinking: The Surprising Truth About Success. London, 13 
John Murray, 2015. 14 
65. Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman: Learning from mistakes: An 15 
investigation report by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 16 
into how the NHS failed to properly investigate the death of a three-year old 17 
child. London, PHSO, 2016. 18 
33 
 1 
